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How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution?  
Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments †
By Ilyana Kuziemko, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, 
and Stefanie Stantcheva *
We analyze randomized online survey experiments providing inter-
active, customized information on US income inequality, the link 
between top income tax rates and economic growth, and the estate 
tax. The treatment has large effects on views about inequality but only 
slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences. An exception is 
the estate tax—informing respondents of the small share of decedents 
who pay it doubles support for it. The small effects for all other pol-
icies can be partially explained by respondents’ low trust in govern-
ment and a disconnect between concerns about social issues and the 
public policies meant to address them. (JEL D31, D72, H23, H24)
The past several decades have seen a large increase in income concentration in the 
United States. While the top 1 percent of families captured 9.0 percent of total pre-
tax income in 1970, that share rose to 22.4 percent by 2012.1 More recent work has 
documented a corresponding trend for wealth concentration: the top 0.1 percent share 
of wealth has grown from 8 percent in the mid-1970s to 22 percent in 2012 (Saez and 
Zucman 2014). These trends have not gone unnoticed, at least by some. The Occupy 
Wall Street movement popularized the term “the 1 percent.” Recently, President 
Obama has called “a dangerous and growing inequality” the “defining challenge of 
our time,” a sentiment echoed by the CEO of Goldman Sachs, who told an interviewer 
that “too much of the GDP of the country has gone to too few of the people.”2
There is a large theoretical literature on the link between inequality and redistribu-
tion. The most widely used median-voter model predicts that a widening gap between 
the average and the median income should lead to an increase in  redistribution, as 
politicians respond to the median voter’s preferences (Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
1 See the updates to Table A3 of Piketty and Saez (2003), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2012prel.xls.
2 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility (accessed 
December 1, 2014) and http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/06/13/3448679/goldman-sachs-income-inequality/ 
(accessed December 1, 2014), respectively.
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Rockoff, four anonymous referees, and numerous seminar and conference participants for helpful comments and dis-
cussions. Pauline Leung provided outstanding research assistance. Financial support from the Center for Equitable 
Growth at UC Berkeley, the MacArthur Foundation, and NSF Grant SES-1156240 is gratefully acknowledged.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130360 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s).
1479KuziemKo et al.: How elastic are Preferences for redistribution?Vol. 105 no. 4
By contrast, top income tax rates as well as inheritance tax rates have fallen in the 
United States during this period.3 While for institutional reasons the policy views 
of the majority might be ignored by policymakers (Bartels 2009), even more chal-
lenging to the model’s predictions is that survey respondents themselves show no 
increased demand for redistribution since the 1970s.4 If anything, the General Social 
Survey shows that there has been a slight decrease in stated support for redistribu-
tion in the United States since the 1970s, even among those who self-identify as 
having below average income (see Figure 1). These trends have led commentators 
to suggest that US residents simply do not care about rising inequality.5
There are alternative explanations: Americans may be unaware of the extent or 
growth of inequality (see Kluegel and Smith 1986 and Norton and Ariely 2011), 
this information may not be sufficiently salient, or they are skeptical about the gov-
ernment’s ability to redistribute effectively.6 In this paper, we extensively examine 
3 For top income tax rates, see Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014), and for estate taxes see IRS calculations at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Kenworthy and McCall (2008), for evidence from a variety of OECD countries that saw increases in 
inequality but no corresponding increase in redistributive demand.
5 As Newsweek put it in 2001: “If Americans couldn’t abide rising inequality, we’d now be demonstrating in the 
streets.” Samuelson, Robert J. 2001. “Indifferent to inequality?” Newsweek, May 7, p. 45.
6 A number of alternative theoretical models make different predictions than the median voter model. Corneo 
and Grüner (2000) propose a model with status effects where the middle class opposes redistribution when this 
leads to more social competition with bottom income earners. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Piketty (1995) 
show that different beliefs on the role of effort versus luck in success can lead to multiple redistributive equilibria. 
Bénabou and Ok (2001) show that the prospect for upward mobility can limit the desire for redistribution. There is 
also a wide empirical literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution (see, e.g., Corneo and Grüner 
2002; Guillaud 2013; and Senik 2009 for evidence from cross-country survey data). 
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Figure 1. The Government Should Reduce Income Differences (Scale from 1–7, GSS)
Notes: This figure depicts responses since 1978 in the US General Social Survey (GSS) on whether the government 
should reduce income differences. The empty diamond series is for all respondents while the full circle series is for 
respondents with below average income. Regression fits are depicted for each series. The graph uses the eqwlth vari-
able from the GSS (though subtracts it from 8 so that it is increasing in support for redistribution).
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these explanations. We conduct a series of randomized survey experiments using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk is a rapidly growing online platform 
that can be used to carry out social and survey experiments (see Horton, Rand, and 
Zeckhauser 2011 and Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). In our initial set of 
experiments, comprising just over 4,000 respondents, one-half of respondents were 
randomized into an “omnibus” treatment providing interactive, personalized infor-
mation on US income inequality, the historical correlation between top income tax 
rates and economic growth, and the incidence of the estate tax. Both control and 
treatment groups then reported their views on inequality, redistributive policies, and 
government more generally. We then conducted follow-up experiments with about 
6,000 new respondents to analyze potential mechanisms behind the initial results, 
for a total of approximately 10,000 respondents.7
Our treatments exploit the flexibility of the mTurk platform to include several 
features that heighten the salience of the information we present. First, some of 
the information we present is customized. For example, we ask individuals their 
household income, allowing us to show them their place in the income distribution, 
as well as their counterfactual income level had aggregate income growth since 
1980 been distributed more equally (so as to leave inequality unchanged). In other 
parts of the survey, we customize information based on respondents’ own household 
composition.8 Second, some of the information is interactive—for example, our sur-
vey allows respondents to enter different household income levels and the software 
survey application provides the corresponding percentile, so that the income distri-
bution can be transparently explored.
The initial survey experiment provides several findings we believe to be novel 
relative to existing literature; the first part of the paper provides a descriptive analy-
sis of these results. First, we find that respondents’ concern about inequality is very 
elastic to information: for example, the treatment increases the share agreeing that 
inequality is a “very serious problem” by over 35 percent. Put differently, the treat-
ment effect is equal to roughly 36 percent of the gap between self-identified liberals 
and self-identified conservatives on this question. By contrast, while there are some 
effects on policy preferences such as top income tax rates, the minimum wage, and 
food stamps (always in the “expected” direction), they are small and often insignif-
icant despite the large sample size.
The only exception is the estate tax: we find that providing information on the 
(small) share of estates subject to the tax more than doubles respondents’ support 
for increasing it. Focusing on the estate tax result, we attempt to make progress on 
two longstanding critiques about survey analysis: that the effects are ephemeral and 
unrelated to actual behavior. We benefit from the mTurk technology and re-survey 
respondents one month later: the estate tax effect is virtually unchanged. We also find 
that the treatment significantly increases the share of respondents who say they would 
send a petition to one of the US senators from their state to raise the estate tax.
7 Survey questions and treatments are all available in the online Appendix.
8 Recent work has highlighted the potential power of customizing information in interventions. For example, 
Hoxby and Turner (2013) credit the customized nature of the information they present to students for the large 
effects their intervention had on college application decisions. 
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The second half of the paper explores the mechanisms behind the large estate 
tax effects and the muted response for any other policy outcome. Of course, other 
explanations may exist and as such we do not view our attempts to tease out the 
mechanisms behind the main results as definitive. Consistent with past work, we 
find that respondents are wildly misinformed about the share of decedents subject to 
the estate tax, which appears to account for the large effects. We further show that 
the estate tax effect remains strong even when we take steps to decrease the salience 
and emotional content of the information provided, further proof that more informa-
tion on this issue has large effects.
We test three potential explanations for the small effects for other policies: limited 
trust in government; an overly “clinical” presentation of information; and respon-
dents’ inability to connect their concerns on a given issue with the public policies 
meant to address it.
The first potential explanation is that distrust in government inhibits respondents 
from translating concern for inequality into support for redistribution by the gov-
ernment. Several results from the original survey experiment point in this direc-
tion. First, our initial treatment significantly decreases trust in government. When 
reminded of the extent of inequality (which even control group respondents view as 
a problem), those in the treatment group appear to at least partially blame the gov-
ernment, perhaps thinking that if politicians “let things get this bad” they cannot be 
trusted to fix it. Second, beyond any treatment effect, the level of government trust 
among our sample of mTurk respondents is very low: over 89 percent agree that 
“Politicians in Washington work to enrich themselves and their largest campaign 
contributors, instead of working for the benefit of the majority of citizens,” with 
47 percent “strongly” agreeing. It is thus perhaps not surprising that even when the 
treatment increases respondents’ concern with inequality, they remain reluctant to 
increase support for government redistributive policies.
In a follow-up survey experiment, we provide direct evidence for the effect of 
trust in government on respondents’ policy preferences. We first asked a small pilot 
group to answer open-ended questions on their views of government: the main theme 
that emerges is that politicians are believed to work to enrich themselves and their 
wealthiest campaign donors. We then used these answers to develop “primes” (e.g., 
asking respondents’ opinions about lobbyists or the Wall Street bailout) that signifi-
cantly lowered trust in government without significantly changing views about the 
extent of inequality or poverty. Therefore, the treatment isolates the causal effect 
of decreasing trust in government. We find that the treatment significantly lowers 
support for all poverty-alleviation policies, with the exception, interestingly, of the 
minimum wage—a program that does not involve direct transfers from the govern-
ment. Support for top tax rates generally falls as well (though only some of these 
effects are significant) and respondents elevate “private charity” over government 
policies in a list of the best ways to combat inequality. This analysis provides, to our 
knowledge, the first direct evidence on the causal effects of trust in government on 
policy preferences, and is particularly relevant given the historically low regard with 
which Americans currently view their government.9
9 See analysis from Gallup: http://www.gallup.com/poll/164663/americans-trust-government-generally- down-
year.aspx (accessed December 1, 2014). The General Social Survey also shows a strongly negative trend. Related 
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Besides distrust muting the policy effects of our treatment, we explore two other 
potential explanations for the small effects in the original survey experiment. As 
Brader (2005) and others argue, policy preferences might respond more to emo-
tional than factual appeals. We thus develop a treatment—again, interactive and 
customized—designed to evoke empathy for households at the poverty line. Just as 
in the initial survey experiment, the treatment significantly increases respondents’ 
tendency to view inequality and poverty as “serious problems” but has almost no 
effect on policy preferences.
We find more support for a third explanation, the idea in Bartels (2005) that the 
public fails to connect concern for inequality with actual public policy measures. To 
test this idea, we repeat much of the information in the “emotional appeal” treat-
ment, but then show respondents concretely the resources provided to such fami-
lies through government programs including the minimum wage and food stamps. 
Therefore, the treatment directly connects poverty and inequality with policies 
meant to address them. Emphasizing this connection appears important: treatment 
respondents significantly increase their support for the minimum wage as well as 
most of the poverty-alleviation programs that we survey. We view this result as 
potentially complementary to the trust results: given the low baseline levels of trust, 
it appears to be the case that policy preferences can only be moved if respondents 
are explicitly reminded of efficacious examples of government intervention.
We believe our findings make several contributions to the understanding of how 
individuals form—and change—their redistributive preferences. Compared to most 
informational interventions that merely provide a fixed set of facts to respondents, 
our informational treatments were interactive and customized—while perhaps 
not providing a strict upper bound on the effects of information on preferences, 
our results do suggest that most policy preferences are hard to move. This finding 
echoes Luttmer and Singhal (2011) that redistributive preferences may have “cul-
tural” determinants that are very stable over time.
Our results also highlight the potential role of mistrust of government in limit-
ing the public’s enthusiasm for policies they would otherwise appear to support, a 
subject that has garnered limited attention in the economics literature. An exception 
is Sapienza and Zingales (2013) who find that a major reason respondents support 
auto fuel standards over a gasoline-tax-and-rebate scheme is not because they mis-
understand the incidence of fuel standards but because they simply do not trust the 
government to actually rebate them their money.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on the determinants of redistrib-
utive preferences, to which political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and pub-
lic economists have all contributed. Many papers in this literature use survey data 
to relate individual traits to redistributive preferences and do not, as we do, take an 
experimental approach. Alesina and Ferrara (2005); Alesina and Giuliano (2011); 
and Fong (2001) show that, respectively, prospects for future income mobility, past 
experience of misfortune, and beliefs about equality of opportunity predict redistrib-
utive preferences. Other papers have examined how situational factors (employment 
status, neighborhood characteristics) predict preferences (see, e.g., Margalit 2013; 
to our finding, Yamamura (2014) finds that above average income respondents in Japan are more likely to support 
redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high.
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Luttmer 2001). Singhal (2008) uses OECD survey data to show that people do not 
necessarily favor low tax rates at income levels close to theirs, suggesting that redis-
tributive preferences are not completely determined by self-interest.
As in our paper, some researchers have estimated the effects of randomized 
informational treatments on policy preferences.10 The evidence from these efforts 
is mixed. Sides (2011) finds that providing information on the very small number 
of individuals affected by the estate tax drastically decreases support for its repeal, 
results that we replicate with our data. Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) find 
that showing poor individuals their actual place in the income distribution increases 
their support for policies that target poverty, as most overestimate their income. On 
the other hand, Kuklinski et al. (2003) find that providing (accurate) information on 
the demographic composition of welfare recipients and the share of the federal bud-
get dedicated to welfare payments has no effect on respondents’ preferences, despite 
the fact that their initial beliefs are wildly incorrect.11 We examine a wide variety of 
redistributive policy outcomes; indeed, we find that the responsiveness of views on 
the estate tax appears to be an outlier and other outcomes suggest a far more modest 
effect of information on redistributive preferences.
As noted, our research is part of a small but growing set of papers using online 
platforms. Researchers have used these platforms—most often, mTurk—to have 
respondents play public goods games (e.g., Rand and Nowak 2011; Suri and Watts 
2010), interact in online labor markets (Amir, Rand, and Gal 2012; Horton, Rand, 
and Zeckhauser 2011), or simply answer non-experimental survey questions on 
views about policy and social preferences (Weinzierl 2012; Saez and Stantcheva 
2013). We summarize our experience conducting survey experiments on mTurk 
in the online methodological Appendix, which we hope can be of use to future 
researchers utilizing this platform.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the initial survey instrument 
and data collection procedures. Section II describes the data. Section III presents the 
main results of the survey experiment. In Section IV, we explore mechanisms behind 
the large effects of information on views about the estate tax and why most other 
effects were so limited, reporting methods and results from four follow-up survey 
experiments. Finally, in Section V, we suggest directions for future work and offer 
concluding thoughts. All our online surveys, data, and programs are available in the 
online Appendix.
I. The Main Survey Experiment
The main experiment was implemented in four separate rounds from January 
2011 to August 2012. For expositional clarity, to distinguish this initial experiment 
from the follow-up work we describe in Section IV, we refer to these four initial 
rounds of surveys as the “omnibus” treatment surveys. The omnibus treatment sur-
veys had the following structure: (i) background socioeconomic questions  including 
10 While not related to policy preferences, there is a small literature on how information treatments affect indi-
viduals’ ability to better navigate policies such as social security (Liebman and Luttmer 2011).
11 Related but distinct from informational treatments are priming and presentational treatments (see, e.g., Savani 
and Rattan 2012 on the effect of priming free will and McCaffery and Baron 2006 on the effects of presenting taxes 
in absolute or percentage terms).
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 typical demographic questions as well as political leanings; (ii) randomized treat-
ment providing information on inequality and tax policy (shown solely to the treat-
ment group); and (iii) questions on views on inequality, tax and transfer policies, 
and government more generally.12
A. Data Collection
Surveys were openly posted on mTurk with a description stating that the survey 
paid $1.50 for approximately 15 minutes, i.e., a $6 hourly wage. Respondents were 
free to drop out any time or take up to one hour to answer all questions. As a com-
parison, the average effective wage on mTurk according to Amazon is around $4.80 
per hour and most tasks on mTurk are short (less than one hour).13
Several steps were taken to ensure the validity of the results. First, there are many 
foreign workers on mTurk, especially from Asia. In addition to requiring respon-
dents to confirm their US residency on the consent form, we also had Amazon show 
the survey only to workers who had US addresses. Second, to further discourage 
foreign workers, we tried to launch our surveys during East Coast daylight hours 
(and, to reduce heterogeneity, only on workdays). Third, to exclude robots, only 
workers with a past completion rate of at least 90 percent were allowed to take the 
survey. Fourth, as our survey comprises many rounds, we screen out workers who 
had participated in a previous round of the survey. Fifth, respondents were told that 
payment would be contingent on completing the survey and providing a password 
visible only at completion. Finally, to discourage respondents from skipping mind-
lessly through the pages, pop-up windows with an encouragement to answer all 
questions appeared as prompts whenever a question was left blank.
B. The Omnibus Information Treatment
In general, the goal of the information treatments was to provide a large “shock” 
to individuals’ knowledge about inequality and redistributive policies, rather than to 
provide a PhD-level, nuanced discussion about, say, the underlying causes of inequal-
ity or the trade-off between equality and efficiency. Hence, some of the treatments we 
display will seem overly simplified to an economics audience, but it should be kept in 
mind that our goal in the initial experiment is to test whether any treatment can move 
redistributive preferences; thus we erred on the side of presenting information we 
thought would indeed move those preferences. As noted in the introduction, we took 
steps to make the information both interactive and customized to each respondent.
The treatment had three basic parts. First, treatment respondents saw interac-
tive information on the current income distribution—they were asked to input 
their household income and were then told what share of households made more 
or less than their household. We also asked them to find particular points in the 
12 The online Appendix provides a complete description of the experiment with the questions for each round of 
the main experiments, and the follow-up experimental rounds discussed later in the paper. 
13 To gauge the external validity of the mTurk results, we gathered data for round 3 using C&T Marketing 
(http://www.ctmarketinggroup.com/) (accessed December 1, 2014). As noted in Section III, effects are stable across 
rounds, suggesting that respondents from the two platforms respond similarly to the treatment. Per-participant costs 
for C&T are roughly five times higher than for mTurk. 
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 distribution—they were asked to find the median and the ninetieth and ninety-ninth 
percentiles and were encouraged to “play around” with the application. Online 
Appendix Figure 2 presents a screen shot.14
The second part focused not on the current distribution but a counterfactual: 
respondents entered their current income and were then shown what they “would 
have made” had economic growth since 1980 been evenly shared across the income 
distribution (i.e., had the level of inequality stayed the same as in 1980). Of course, 
this exercise abstracts away from the trade-off between efficiency (economic 
growth) and equality that would certainly exist at very high levels of taxation. The 
interactive application allowed them to find this counterfactual value for any point 
of the current income distribution. Online Appendix Figure 4 presents a screen shot.
The third part of the treatment focused on redistributive policies. To emphasize 
that higher income taxes on the well-off need not always lead to slower economic 
growth, we presented respondents a figure showing that, at least as a raw correlation, 
economic growth, measured by average real pre-tax income per family from tax 
return data, has been slower during periods with low top tax rates (1913–1933 and 
1980–2010) than with high top tax rates (1933–1980). Online Appendix Figure 3 
presents a screen shot. Similarly, we also presented a slide on the estate tax, empha-
sizing that it currently only affects the largest 0.1 percent of estates and that it favors 
intergenerational mobility. Online Appendix Figure 4 shows a screen shot.
Readers can directly experience these informational treatments online at the 
link below.15 We describe the additional treatments in the follow-up surveys in 
Section IV.
II. Data
A. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows characteristics of the sample who completed the omnibus treat-
ment survey rounds (we discuss attrition below). We compare these summary sta-
tistics to a nationally representative sample of US adults contacted by a Columbia 
Broadcasting Company (CBS) poll in 2011, which we choose both because it was 
conducted around the same time as our surveys and asks very similar questions.16 
We also compare it to a more representative (though far more expensive) online 
panel survey gathered by RAND, the American Life Panel (ALP).17
14 As detailed in online Appendix Table 1 we also ask treatment respondents six “basic comprehension” ques-
tions to determine if the information was confusing. With one exception, each question exhibits at least 80 percent 
comprehension. Moreover, more than 74 percent of respondents answer at least five of the six questions correctly. 
There are no differential treatment effects by comprehension level (results available upon request), not surprising 
given that comprehension is at a fairly high (and uniform) level. 
15 See https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn. Note that the control group went straight 
from the background questions to the outcome measures (starting with the preferred tax rates sliders). 
16 Note that the CBS sample is not as representative as the traditional surveys used by economists such as the 
Current Population Survey or the American Community Survey. However, these two surveys do not have questions 
on past voting behavior or political preferences, so we rely on the admittedly less representative CBS survey. 
17 The ALP currently costs researchers $3 per subject per minute, compared to roughly $0.10 per subject per 
minute for our mTurk surveys. The ALP survey is also limited in sample size. 
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Our sample is younger, more educated and has fewer minorities. It is more lib-
eral, with a higher fraction reporting having supported President Obama in the 2008 
presidential election.18
Table 2 shows summary statistics on demographic and policy views for self-re-
ported liberals (column 1) and conservatives (column 2) from our control group 
(so that responses are not contaminated by the information treatment), as well as 
the entire control group (column 3). As expected, conservatives are older, more 
white, and more likely to be married. They prefer lower taxes on the rich and a 
less generous safety net. Such contrasts are useful to scale the magnitude of our 
effects. We will often discuss treatment effects both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of the liberal-versus-conservative differences reported in Table 2. For 
convenience, we refer to this difference as the “political gap” for a given outcome 
variable.
B. Survey Attrition
The omnibus survey experiment had an overall attrition rate of 22 percent, which 
includes those who attritted as early as the consent page. For those who remained 
online long enough to be assigned a treatment status, attrition was 15 percent.
As online Appendix Table 2 shows, attrition is not random, though it is unre-
lated to 2008 voting preferences and liberal versus conservative policy views (the 
variables most highly correlated with our outcome variables). The online survey 
for the treatment group was, by necessity, different from the online survey for 
18 As a robustness check, we created weights to match our mTurk sample in column 1 to the CBS poll in col-
umn 2 with respect to the 32 cells based on: gender (2)  × age brackets (2)  × white versus non-white (2)  × college 
degree indicator (2)  × Supported Obama in 2008 (2). Reweighting has no appreciable effects on the results in 
Tables 4 and 5 (results available upon request) and thus we focus on the unweighted results in the paper. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics and Comparison to Other Polling and Online Data
mTurk sample CBS election poll American Life Panel
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.428 0.476 0.417
Age 35.41 48.99 48.94
White (non-Hispanic) 0.778 0.739 0.676
Black 0.0756 0.116 0.109
Hispanic 0.0444 0.0983 0.180
Other racial/ethnic group 0.0759 0.0209 0.0410
Employed (full or part) 0.465 0.587 0.557
Unemployed 0.123 0.104 0.103
Married 0.397 0.594 0.608
Has college degree 0.433 0.318 0.309
Voted for Obama 0.675 0.555 0.559
Political views,
 conservatives (1) to liberals (3)
2.176 1.586
Observations 3,741 808 1,002
Notes: This table displays summary statistics from our mTurk omnibus surveys in column 1 along with (weighted) 
averages based on a 2011 CBS news survey in column 2 and RAND’s online American Life Panel (ALP) in col-
umn 3. We are grateful to Ray Fisman for providing us with summary statistics from the ALP.
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the control group. Therefore, a key concern is differential attrition between those 
assigned to the  treatment versus control arms. As the final row of Table 2 shows, 
attrition is higher among the treatment group (20 percent, versus 9 percent for the 
control group).19
Importantly, however, conditional on finishing the survey, assignment to treatment 
appears randomly assigned. That is, while the treatment induces attrition overall, it 
does not induce certain groups to differentially quit the survey more than others. 
Table 3 shows the results from estimating (using the sample who complete the sur-
vey) 14 separate regressions of the form:  Treatmen t ir = βCovariat e ir +  δ r +  ϵ ir , 
where  i indexes the individual,  r the survey rounds, and  δ r are survey-round fixed 
effects.20 For each regression, one of the control variables in Table 2 serves as 
Covariate. Of the 14 regressions, only two (for the  black and  Hispanic indicators) 
yield significant coefficients on the  Covariate variable. However, given that their 
19 For this comparison, we can obviously only include individuals who remained in the survey long enough 
to have been assigned a treatment status. The other comparisons in this table include all those who remained long 
enough to answer the given covariate question. 
20 We include round fixed effects  δ r because in one round we assigned more than half the respondents to the 
treatment. As such, without round fixed effects,  Treatment becomes mechanically correlated to the characteristics 
of respondents in this round. 
Table 2—Summary Statistics for the Control Group, Split by Liberals and Conservatives 
Liberals Conservatives All
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.407 0.472 0.422
Age 32.618 39.823 35.557
White 0.752 0.838 0.776
Black 0.090 0.063 0.085
Hispanic 0.039 0.027 0.037
Asian 0.090 0.053 0.078
Married 0.302 0.543 0.402
Has college degree 0.462 0.455 0.430
Unemployed 0.140 0.076 0.121
Not in labor force 0.093 0.208 0.144
Voted for Obama in 2008 0.914 0.303 0.674
Inequality has increased 0.836 0.615 0.738
Inequality is a very serious problem 0.414 0.129 0.285
Top tax rate 34.181 23.996 30.205
Increase millionaire tax 0.904 0.452 0.740
Increase estate tax 0.254 0.080 0.171
Increase min. wage 0.822 0.496 0.690
Support food stamps 0.850 0.446 0.686
Support EITC 0.722 0.418 0.611
Trust government 0.171 0.148 0.158
Scope of government is broad 3.552 2.349 3.076
Said would petition for higher income taxes 
 (early rounds only)
0.288 0.118 0.238
Send petition for high estate tax 0.305 0.141 0.234
Plan to vote Democrat 2012 0.800 0.182 0.529
Observations 821 475 1,976
Notes: This table displays summary statistics based on control respondents from the omnibus surveys, stratified by 
self-reported liberal versus conservative status (on a five-point scale, very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, 
very conservative). Column 1 is for liberals (less than 3 on the scale) while column 2 is for conservatives (more than 
3 on the scale). Column 3 shows summary statistics for the entire control group, including the “center of the road” 
respondents. The complete wording of these survey questions is reported in the online Appendix.
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point-estimates have opposite signs, it does not seem that, say, minorities systemat-
ically attrit from the sample if they are assigned to the treatment.
While we will control for these covariates as well as perform additional 
checks of attrition in the analysis that follows, it is reassuring to see that, con-
ditional on finishing the survey, there does not appear to be a discernible pattern 
in the types of respondents assigned to treatment. We are quite fortunate in this 
regard, as one might have expected that groups predisposed against reading about 
 inequality—perhaps conservatives or wealthier people—would have been “turned 
off” by the treatment and differentially attritted. The follow-up surveys discussed 
in Sections IV have essentially zero differential attrition by treatment status (see 
online Appendix Table 3), most likely because the treatments in the follow-up sur-
veys are much shorter (making the treatment and control arms of the survey much 
closer in length).
III. Results from the Omnibus Treatment
We present three sets of results. First, we analyze how the treatment affects 
respondents’ answers to questions related to inequality per se, not policies that 
might affect it. Second, we analyze specific policies, e.g., raising taxes or increasing 
the minimum wage. Third, we analyze respondents’ views about government as 
well as their political engagement.
A. Views on Inequality
Table 4 presents the effect of the omnibus treatment on questions related to 
inequality. Odd-numbered columns do not include any controls outside of round 
Table 3—Ability of Covariates to Predict Treatment Status, 
Conditional on Finishing the Survey 
Coefficient P-value
Voted for Obama in 2008 0.003 0.856
Age −0.001 0.479
Liberal policy view 0.002 0.751
Household income 0.005 0.109
Married −0.013 0.434
Education −0.003 0.575
Male 0.013 0.447
Black −0.066 0.031
Hispanic 0.091 0.021
Native −0.043 0.201
Employed full time −0.012 0.502
Unemployed 0.015 0.539
Not in labor force 0.021 0.376
Student −0.027 0.235
Notes: For each row, the coefficient and  p -value are from regressions of the form 
 Assigned to treatmen t ir = α + βCovariat e i +  δ r +  ϵ ir , where  Covariate is listed to the left 
in the row and  δ r are survey round fixed effects. Those tests are used to detect selective attri-
tion (as treatment respondents are approximately ten percentage points less likely to complete 
the omnibus survey than are control respondents, see online Appendix Table 3). If we regress 
treatment status jointly on all covariates and survey round fixed effects, we obtain a p-value for 
joint significance of 0.12.
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fixed effects, while even-numbered columns include standard controls (essentially, 
those listed in Table 3).21
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the treatment is associated with a 10-percent-
age-point (or 36 percent) increase in the share agreeing that inequality is a “very seri-
ous” problem. Similarly, dividing the point-estimate by the “political gap” (i.e., the 
liberal-conservative control group difference for the outcome variable) suggests that 
the treatment effect is equal to 36 percent of the political gap on this question (equal 
to 38 points in Table 2). While a convenient scaling, dividing by the political gap is 
hardly a perfect metric—while political views are highly predictive of many of our 
outcomes, this tendency varies and therefore some questions have larger political gaps 
than others. We thus report both the absolute and scaled effects for all regressions. 
Adding covariates in column 2 has no effect on the estimated treatment effect.
The effects on the outcome “did inequality increase since 1980?” are presented in 
columns 3 and 4 and are even larger both in absolute percentage points and when scaled 
by the political gap (54 percent of the conservative-liberal difference), likely because 
the informational treatment presented information directly related to the question.
The effects on respondents’ opinion of whether the rich are deserving of their 
income are presented in columns 5 and 6. They are statistically significant, but 
markedly smaller in magnitude—equal to about 5 percentage points, or one-sixth 
of the political gap. Therefore, it does not seem that treatment respondents’ concern 
about inequality is being driven primarily by a vilification of the rich.
In no case does the choice to exclude or include controls change the results (consis-
tent with the results from Table 3 that conditional on finishing the survey, there was little 
correlation between treatment status and standard covariates). Therefore, to conserve 
space and reduce noise, we show all results with covariates in the rest of the analysis.
21 Specifically, we include fixed effects for racial/ethnic categories, employment status, and state of residence; 
indicator variables for voting for Barack Obama in 2008, being married, gender, and native-born status; continuous 
controls for age; and categorical variables for the liberal-to-conservative self-rating, household income, and education. 
Table 4—Effect of Omnibus Treatment on Opinions about Inequality 
(“First-Stage” outcomes) 
Inequality very serious Inequality increased Rich deserving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.120*** −0.0500*** −0.0526***
[0.0154] [0.0144] [0.0130] [0.0128] [0.0119] [0.0114]
Control mean 0.285 0.285 0.738 0.738 0.180 0.180
Scaled effect 0.357 0.365 0.539 0.540 0.173 0.182
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,703 3,703 3,704 3,704 3,690 3,690
Notes: The three outcome variables are binary indicator variables, coded as one if the respondent says that “inequal-
ity is a very serious problem,” “inequality has increased,” and “the rich are deserving of their income,” respectively. 
All regressions have round fixed effects, even those labeled as including “no” covariates. Controls for covariates 
further include all variables in the randomization table (Table 3), plus state-of-residence fixed effects. “Scaled 
effect” is the coefficient on Treated divided by the difference between control group liberals and conservatives. The 
row “Control mean” reports the mean of the outcome variable for the entire control group.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Overall, our omnibus treatment generated a very strong “first stage,” significantly 
shifting views about inequality and its increase in recent decades.
B. Views on Public Policy
Table 5 presents results for questions related to income and estate taxation. The 
first two columns report results from the two questions on income taxation—a 
continuous variable asking respondents to choose an ideal average tax rate for the 
richest 1 percent and a categorical variable asking them whether taxes on million-
aires should be raised—show statistically significant effects of the treatment, in 
the “expected” direction.22 However, these magnitudes are small, equal to about 
10 percent of the liberal-conservative gap in both cases. For example, the treatment 
increases the preferred top 1 percent average tax rate by 0.93 percentage points, 
whereas the gap between liberals and conservatives on this question is slightly over 
10 percentage points (see Table 2). Hence, we can rule out an effect on the tax rate 
for the top 1 percent larger than 20 percent of the liberal conservative gap.
The omnibus treatment was hardly subtle in its discussion of income taxes, focus-
ing on how income growth might be shared more equitably through higher taxation 
and illustrating the temporal correlation between periods of high top tax rates and 
strong economic growth. We also asked the income tax question in two different 
ways, so the small magnitude of the results is unlikely to be an artifact of framing.
By contrast, there are very large effects for the estate tax (column 3 of Table 5), con-
sistent with Sides (2011). The treatment triples the share of respondents supporting an 
increase in the estate tax, and the effect size is more than double the  liberal- conservative 
gap on this question. We explore in the next section the reasons behind the large estate 
tax effects. We show that both the informational and the emotional content of the estate 
22 See online Appendix Figure 5 for the screen respondents used to choose their ideal tax rates. 
Table 5—Effect of Omnibus Treatment on Policy Preferences
Top rate $1M tax Estate Petition Min. wage Trust Scope Dem 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.931* 0.0502** 0.357*** 0.0648*** 0.0325** −0.0292** 0.132*** 0.0152
[0.549] [0.0126] [0.0140] [0.0156] [0.0141] [0.0115] [0.0339] [0.0125]
Control mean 30.21 0.740 0.171 0.234 0.690 0.158 3.076 0.529
Scaled effect 0.0914 0.111 2.043 0.394 0.0995 1.250 0.110 0.0246
Observations 3,741 3,704 3,673 3,060 3,690 3,702 3,704 3,703
Notes: “Top rate” is continuous (respondents’ preferred average tax rate (in percent) on the richest 1  percent). 
“Scope” is also continuous (a 1–5 variable, increasing in the preferred scope of government activities). All other vari-
ables are binary. “$1M tax” and “Estate” indicate the respondent wants income taxes on millionaires and the estate 
tax to increase, respectively. “Petition” indicates she would write her Senator to increase the estate tax. “Min. wage” 
indicates support for increasing the minimum wage. “Trust” indicates trust in government and “Dem 2012” indicates 
the respondent plans to vote for the Democrat (Obama) in the 2012 presidential election. “Covariates” and “scaled 
effects” are as specified in the notes to Table 4. The row “Control mean” reports the mean of the outcome variable in 
the control group. All regressions in this and subsequent tables include control variables as defined in Table 4.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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tax treatment matter (a purely clinical information treatment with no emotional com-
ponent increases support by 50 percent instead of more than doubling it).
A common critique of survey experiments that find large effects on opinion is 
that one cannot know how these effects impact actual behavior. We try to partially 
bridge this gap by asking individuals whether they would send a petition to their US 
senator asking either to raise or lower the estate tax. We provided a link to senators’ 
e-mails and also provided sample messages both for and against raising estate taxes. 
We then asked if the respondent would send a petition for higher taxes, a petition 
against higher taxes, or nothing at all.
We report these results in column 4. The treatment significantly increases the pro-
pensity of respondents to say they would petition their US senator to raise the estate 
tax (though, not surprisingly, this effect is smaller than the pure opinion question, 
suggesting attenuation from belief to action). Naturally, we recognize that we must 
take respondents’ word that they will send the e-mail and thus this outcome is not 
as concrete as, for example, knowing with certainty how they would vote in the next 
election. At the very least, this result confirms the strong effect of the treatment on 
views about the estate tax. As mentioned, we probe later on the robustness of this 
result and offer some thoughts on why it is so different from the income tax. For 
now we merely note that these large results serve to dismiss a potential explanation 
of why the income tax results were so small—that there is something inherent in the 
mTurk experience that mutes respondents’ policy responses.
While so far we have focused on policies that affect the well-off, we also asked a 
series of questions about policies that impact the bottom of the income distribution. 
While the treatment induces significant but small (less than 10 percent of the politi-
cal gap) effects for the minimum wage (column 5), it induces no significant increase 
in support for food stamps or the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (results reported 
in online Appendix Table 4).23 The results thus suggest a contrast between direct 
transfer policies such as the EITC and food stamps and indirect transfer policies 
such as the minimum wage, a theme that will also emerge in some of the follow-up 
work discussed in the next section.24
C. Views of Government and Political Involvement 
Columns 6–8 of Table 5 reports results on the effect of the treatment on opinions 
about government. The first question asked respondents: “How much of the time 
do you think you can trust government in Washington to do what is right?” and we 
code a respondent as trusting government if she answers “always” or “most of the 
time” as opposed to “only some of the time” and “never.”25 Column 6 reports a large 
decrease in the share of treatment respondents agreeing that the government can be 
trusted. The treatment is equal to the entire liberal-conservative gap, but operates 
23 In later follow-up work, we asked a small pilot group to write open-ended responses to many of our outcome 
variables. Many respondents had little familiarity with the EITC (though we always provided a description) so the 
non-result for that outcome might need to be interpreted more cautiously. No respondent indicated unfamiliarity 
with food stamps or the minimum wage, however. 
24 There are other possible distinctions between these policies. For example, respondents may have stronger 
racial stereotypes of food-stamp recipients than they do of minimum-wage workers. 
25 This question is taken from the American National Election Studies (ANES): http://www.electionstudies.org/
nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm (accessed December 1, 2014).
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in the opposite direction to the other outcomes, in that it makes respondents take 
the more conservative—and less trusting—view on this question.26 Note also that, 
consistent with the trends noted in the introduction, the control group has a very 
low level of trust in government—only about 16 percent are trusting of government, 
by our definition—and that the contrast of liberals and conservatives about trusting 
government is fairly small (17 versus 14.5 percent: see Table 2). The low baseline 
level of trust in the control group suggests that the treatment effect we observe might 
in fact understate the true effect experienced by the treatment group, as their ability 
to express an even lower opinion of government is limited by floor effects.
The second question assesses respondents’ preferred scope of government: 
“Next, think more broadly about the purpose of government. Where would you rate 
yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do 
only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 
5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to 
try and improve the lives of its citizens?”27 Intriguingly, the treatment significantly 
moves people toward wanting a more active government (column 7 of Table 5). 
Providing information about the growth of inequality and the ability of the govern-
ment to raise taxes and redistribute have complicated effects on views of govern-
ment. It appears to make respondents see more areas of society where government 
intervention may be needed but simultaneously make them trust government less. 
We return to these results linking trust in government to preferences on government 
scope in Section IV.
Finally, as shown in column 8, the treatment has almost no effect on respon-
dents’ planned voting choice for the 2012 presidential elections (recall that the 
omnibus-treatment surveys were completed before the November 2012 election). 
There is at best a marginal effect in the direction of supporting President Obama. 
This result is consistent with the relatively mild policy effects overall. The treatment 
may simultaneously make individuals want the more redistributive policies of the 
Democratic party and distrust the party in power (the Democrats under Obama, at 
least in the executive branch and the Senate).28
D. Robustness Checks
Persistence of Effects.—Before mTurk, recontacting survey respondents was 
onerous, and thus few papers were able to test the duration of effects from informa-
tional survey experiments. None of the papers cited in the introduction on the effect 
of information on redistributive preferences follows up with respondents to measure 
the duration of the effects.29
26 We say that being less trusting of government is the “conservative” view because in our data as well as GSS 
data from the same time period, conservatives indeed report lower trust in government. These tendencies are sen-
sitive to the party in power (e.g., in the GSS, during the George W. Bush administration, conservatives were more 
trusting of the executive branch than were liberals). 
27 This question comes from Gallup.
28 In the interest of space, there are some outcome variables we relegate to the online Appendix. The full set of 
all results from the omnibus survey are found in online Appendix Tables 4, 5, 6. 
29 In their review of the use of survey experiments, Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk (2007) name measuring dura-
tion effects as their top recommendation for future work in the area. 
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The evidence from the few papers that do test persistence is not encouraging. 
Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell (2002) find that even the immediate effects of an 
extreme intervention—in which British participants spent a weekend with experts, 
with the goal of debunking misconceptions about crime and prison policy—do not 
persist ten months later. Indeed, in a similarly intense intervention focused on issues 
related to campaign finance, Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that their results 
dissipate within ten days. While not a survey experiment per se, Gerber et al. (2011) 
use variation in the location of campaign television advertising to show that per-
suasive effects are strong the week the ad airs but have little persistence beyond the 
first week. Perhaps closest to our methodology, Lecheler and Vreese (2011) sample 
Dutch respondents to test for the effect of informational treatments on opinions 
about economic aid to Bulgaria and Romania; while the treatment effect persisted 
after one week, it was insignificant after two.
The flexibility of the mTurk platform offers the possibility of resurveying partici-
pants months after the original survey. In the third round of the omnibus survey, we 
attempted to recontact respondents one month after taking the survey. Out of 1,039 
respondents who completed the original survey, 145 (14 percent) completed the 
follow-up survey. The follow-up survey asked most of the outcome questions in the 
original survey, but did not include the informational treatment.
With a relatively low take-up rate, a concern is that follow-up respondents are 
differentially selected. Online Appendix Table 7 suggests that while some selec-
tion takes place (by age, marital status, and employment status) the most important 
variables in terms of predicting preferences (support of Obama and overall liberal-
versus- conservative policy views) show no differential selection into the follow-up 
sample. Nor does initial treatment status predict take-up and thus we have a roughly 
equal number of control and treatment observations in the follow-up sample.
We compare the original results for these 145 observations to their responses one 
month later for selected outcomes in Table 6 and for all other outcomes in online 
Appendix Tables 8 and 9. As only some outcomes show a substantial initial treat-
ment effect for the  N = 145 subsample, it is not feasible to have meaningful tests 
of persistence for all outcomes.
Columns 1 and 2 show that our most robust outcome result from the original sur-
vey—support for increasing the estate tax—is strongly persistent. In absolute terms, 
58 percent of the effect size remains one month later, more than doubling the share 
who support the policy. And the effect one month later remains highly statistically 
significant.
Columns 3 and 4 show similarly strong results for views on the proper scope of 
government. The follow-up result in column 4 actually shows an increase in the 
point-estimate, though it is within the confidence interval of the result in column 3.
Columns 5 and 6 show that the initial treatment effect on “trust in government” is 
slightly larger than for the full sample, with a negative, but now insignificant effect 
persisting one month later.
Unfortunately, as columns 7 and 8 show, one of the main outcome variables from 
the omnibus survey—concern for inequality—yields an initial treatment effect of 
essentially zero for the subsample, and thus testing for persistence is not partic-
ularly meaningful. Given that our initial treatment often had small effects for the 
entire sample, it is not surprising that only some outcomes yield substantial initial 
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 treatment effects for the subsample. We thus relegate the follow-up results for all 
these outcomes to online Appendix Tables 8 and 9.
Overall, the follow-up analysis shows, once again, that the estate tax emerges as 
the policy most robustly and significantly affected by our omnibus treatment.
Bounding the Effects of Differential Attrition.—While we showed in Table 3 that, 
conditional on finishing the survey, assignment to the treatment appears as good as 
random, here we further probe the potential effects of attrition. To conduct a bound-
ing exercise, we assume either that (i) attriters would have all had the average “lib-
eral” view for each outcome; or (ii) they would have had the average “conservative” 
view for each outcome. Given that attrition does not actually vary by political views 
(see online Appendix Table 2) but outcome values vary substantially by political 
views (see Table 2), this test should provide generous upper bounds on the potential 
effects of attrition. The results in online Appendix Table 10 shows that no signs 
flip for any of our main outcome variables under either the conservative (columns 
labeled “C”) or liberal (columns labeled “L”) attrition assumptions.
Next, we examine how the level of differential attrition affects our results: do 
our results only hold in survey rounds with high differential attrition between the 
control and treatment group? The first three rounds of the omnibus surveys had 
very similar differential attrition rates (between 12 and 16 percent), whereas the 
fourth had a substantially lower attrition rate (5 percent). Online Appendix Tables 
11 and 12 show that our main results on concern for inequality, support for the estate 
tax, and trust in government are robust and at times stronger for the low-differen-
tial-attrition round, the round where we expect our identification assumptions to be 
most robust. As before, the “non-results” for other outcomes remain (not shown).30 
In Section IV, we analyze follow-up surveys where the treatment is much shorter 
and where there is virtually no differential attrition by treatment status (see online 
30 In our context, the only observable variable that is correlated with differential attrition between control and 
treatment is the round of the experiment. Hence, our comparison across rounds is the simplest and most transparent 
nonparametric form of DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (DFL) reweighting. 
Table 6—Results from the Follow-Up Survey One Month Later
Increase
estate tax
Government
scope
Trust 
government
Inequality very 
serious
First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up First Follow-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.337*** 0.195*** 0.259 0.364* −0.122** −0.0691 0.00833 0.102
[0.0953] [0.0910] [0.207] [0.200] [0.0611] [0.0582] [0.0809] [0.0770]
Control mean 0.180 0.179 2.995 2.910 0.122 0.128 0.283 0.218
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: All outcomes and terms are as defined in Tables 4 and 5. For each dependent variable, column “First” is the 
result from the first survey, while column “Follow-up” is the result from the follow-up survey one month after the 
initial survey. We use a more limited set of control variables given the small sample size. All regressions are run on 
the subsample of respondents who entirely completed the follow up survey.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Appendix Table 3). The fact that these follow-up surveys largely confirm our omni-
bus treatment results provides further reassurance that differential attrition is not 
driving our results.
Robustness Across Rounds.—As our rounds took place at different dates with dif-
ferent stories dominating the news cycle, we might worry that the treatment effects 
are being driven by a single round. We verified that dropping rounds one by one does 
not change the sign or significance of the main results.
Survey Fatigue.—Finally, “survey fatigue” would not seem to explain our results. 
For example, the question “is inequality a serious problem” comes before top tax 
rates, which precedes the estate tax question, our strongest effect. Therefore, there is 
no monotonic relationship between the strength of the treatment effect and the order 
of the outcome variables.
Experimenter Demand Effects.—A potential bias that is more difficult to measure 
is differential experimenter demand effects—perhaps it is the case that a variable 
such as “inequality is a serious problem” is more susceptible to demand effects 
than concrete policy questions such as “preferred top income tax rates.” An indirect 
test is to examine gender differences by outcome variable, as women appear more 
likely to give the “desired” answer (see, e.g., Bernardi 2006; Dalton and Ortegren 
2011; and citations therein). We find very small gender differences overall, and no 
pattern whereby they are larger for women for the “first-stage” outcomes (results 
available upon request). Recent work argues that demand effects are likely muted 
with Internet surveys (see, e.g., Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008 and Gelder, 
Bretveld, and Roeleveld 2010).
IV. Understanding Our Results with Follow-up Surveys
The follow-up surveys share the following structure. While we repeated most 
of the outcome questions used in the omnibus surveys, there are some differences 
(based on input from referees and others). For example, we ask respondents to 
report whether “poverty is a serious problem,” as well as rank “private charity” and 
“education” in a list of tools to address inequality (so as to gauge whether respon-
dents react to the treatments by turning to options—some nongovernmental—more 
often advocated by political conservatives).31 We also replace the question about 
the EITC (which we feared might not be sufficiently familiar to respondents) with a 
general question about “aid to the poor” and a specific question about public hous-
ing, while retaining the minimum wage and food stamp questions.
For the sake of completeness, we used the same battery of outcome questions 
for all follow-up surveys, even when certain follow-up treatments were unlikely 
to affect a given outcome. For the sake of brevity and exposition, we only discuss 
in the main text those outcomes that are relevant to a given treatment, but all other 
31 For example, Mccall and Kenworthy (2009) argue that Americans care about inequality but prefer policy 
levers such as education to combat it, not income redistribution. In our data, (control group) conservatives are indeed 
more likely to rank education and private charity above tools that more directly involve government redistribution. 
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 outcomes are reported in the online Appendix for each treatment. Importantly, in this 
 section, we use data solely from the follow-up surveys because the control groups 
in the omnibus survey and the follow-up surveys are not directly comparable, and 
because the wording of some of the questions has changed.
Section A explores why the estate tax appears to be an anomaly, first verifying 
that the effect is robust to changes in presentation and then measuring the pure infor-
mational impact of our treatment. Section B explores potential mechanisms for why 
most other policies are more impervious to informational interventions.
A. Why Are Views about the Estate Tax So Elastic to Information?
In this section, we present two types of follow-up analysis on the estate tax. First, 
we verify whether the estate tax treatment effect—an outlier among the policy out-
comes analyzed in the previous section—is truly robust. After showing that it with-
stands several significant modifications of the treatment, we then present evidence 
as to why this effect is so strong. Our view is that misinformation about the estate 
tax is far greater than for the other policies we surveyed, such that the informational 
treatment has an especially large impact.32
Verifying the Large Estate Tax Effects.—Recall that the omnibus treatment 
includes not only information about the incidence of the estate tax, but several other 
components as well (e.g., the interactive feature showing respondents’ place in the 
income distribution, among the others we described in Section I). To gauge the 
sensitivity of the estate tax effect to this additional information, we redid the experi-
ment with a treatment that only included the slide on the estate tax. Furthermore, the 
original estate tax treatment shows a picture of a mansion and notes that the estate 
tax can help “level the playing field” (see online Appendix Figure 4). We thus for-
mulated a treatment that decreased the emotional impact of the estate tax treatment 
and that only mentions the incidence in dry, factual terms (see online Appendix 
Figure 6). We call the first version the “emotional estate tax treatment” and the sec-
ond the “neutral estate tax treatment.” Again, neither of these treatments contains 
the other, non-estate-tax components of the omnibus treatment.
Table 7 displays results for the key outcome variables. In contrast to the omni-
bus treatment, the “emotional” estate tax treatment has no effect on views about 
whether inequality is a problem, whether it has increased, or whether the rich are 
“deserving” (columns 1, 2, and 3). The “neutral” treatment appears to have counter-
vailing effects: increasing concern for inequality (though this effect is much smaller 
than that of the omnibus treatment) while decreasing the sense that inequality has 
increased. These much weaker effects are not surprising because these two treat-
ments provide no information about income inequality or its trends.
However, column 4 shows that the effect of even these more limited treatments on 
opinions about the estate tax remains strong. The point estimate for the  “emotional 
32 Theoretically, the prospect for upward mobility mechanism of Bénabou and Ok (2001) that limits the desire 
for redistribution might become irrelevant when respondents realize that only 1 decedent out of 1,000 pays the estate 
tax. Following Alesina and Angeletos’s (2005) theory, respondents might also support the estate tax on the very 
wealthy as they realize that receiving a very large inheritance is due entirely to luck and not effort of the inheritor. 
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treatment” is nearly as large as that of the omnibus treatment (0.289 versus 0.357). 
The “neutral” effect is smaller (0.109), though both in absolute and scaled terms 
swamps any policy effect (excluding the estate tax itself) associated with the omni-
bus treatment. Recall that the omnibus treatment provided extensive interactive and 
 personalized information on income inequality and income tax rates and typically 
produced scaled effects on the income tax outcomes of 10 percent. The “neutral” 
estate tax treatment consisted of a total of four sentences but nonetheless produced 
a scaled effect on the estate tax four times as large (40.8 percent of the liberal- 
conservative gap). This stark contrast highlights how much more elastic to infor-
mation views about the estate tax are than those about the income tax and other 
policies.
As shown in column 5, both treatments make respondents more likely to say 
they will petition their senator (scaled effects greater than 0.2), but this effect is not 
statistically significant. The significant effect with the omnibus treatment suggests 
that the background information on growing inequality might be required to induce 
more respondents to connect their policy views with political activism. Column 6 
shows that the effect on trust in government is negative (as in the omnibus treat-
ment) but not significant.33
Why are Estate Tax Preferences So Malleable to Information?— At first, we 
attributed this finding to our treatment having larger effects for topics that held lit-
tle ex ante salience for our respondents. However, recent polling data suggests the 
33 Given that the omnibus treatment had, at best, small effects on income tax and transfer policies, it is not sur-
prising that the estate-tax-only treatments do not produce consistently significant effects on these outcomes either 
(online Appendix Table 13 and 14).
Table 7—Results from the Estate Tax Survey 
Inequality 
very serious
Inequality 
increased Deserving
Estate
tax Petition Trust
Estate tax 
corr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated (emotional) 0.0381 −0.00239 −0.0247 0.289*** 0.0313 −0.0164 0.316***
[0.0258] [0.0243] [0.0206] [0.0258] [0.0208] [0.0205] [0.0263]
Treated (neutral) 0.0511** −0.0501** −0.0244 0.109** 0.0239 −0.00558 0.375***
[0.0259] [0.0244] [0.0206] [0.0259] [0.0209] [0.0205] [0.0264]
Control mean 0.307 0.771 0.174 0.210 0.132 0.153 0.120
Scaled emotional effect 0.118 0.011 0.098 1.085 0.265 0.235 3.386
Scaled neutral effect 0.159 0.223 0.097 0.408 0.202 0.080 4.014
p-value 0.612 0.049 0.991 0.000 0.722 0.598 0.026
Observations 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,762 1,756 1,773
Notes: The “emotional” treatment repeats the estate tax slide from the omnibus treatment, but eliminates the rest of 
the treatment. The “neutral” treatment is a version of the “emotional” treatment that attempts to remove any fram-
ing effects or emotional appeals to focus solely on the information. The outcomes in columns 1–6 are as defined 
in Tables 4 and 5. (“Deserving” is the abbreviation for “the rich are deserving of their income”). “Estate tax corr.” 
indicates that the respondent chose the correct multiple-choice outcome for a question asking what share of people 
who die are subject to the estate tax. p-value is the p-value of the test that the coefficients on the treated “emotional” 
and the treated “neutral” are the same.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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estate tax is very salient to respondents—in 2010, Gallup respondents named avert-
ing an increase in the estate tax as their top priority for the lame-duck session of 
Congress, above extending unemployment benefits and the Bush income tax cuts.34 
Moreover, there were no more “missing” responses on the estate tax question than 
on other policy questions in the control group, further evidence that the estate tax is 
not an obscure issue to respondents in our sample.
A more promising explanation is that while respondents may view the estate 
tax as a salient issue, they may hold misinformed views on the topic. Indeed, as 
documented by Slemrod (2006), 82 percent of respondents favor estate tax repeal 
but 49 percent of respondents believe that most families have to pay it, compared to 
31 percent who believe only a few families have to pay, and 20 percent who admit 
to not knowing. In contrast, the public appears much better informed about policies 
such as the minimum wage or the individual income tax.35 As a result, providing 
basic information on how the current federal estate tax is limited to the very wealth-
iest families might serve as a large informational shock.
We directly tested this hypothesis by adding a question on the incidence of the 
estate tax to the follow-up surveys. Respondents were asked to choose the share of 
decedents subject to the estate tax from among the following percentage options: 
less then 1, 1, 10, 20, 40, 60, and 100 percent. If anything, the greater detail offered 
for choices below 20 percent would seem to tip off respondents that the answer is 
a small number, but only 12 percent of control group respondents answered cor-
rectly (random guessing would be correct 14 percent of the time) and accuracy 
varied substantially by political orientation (16 percent of liberals versus 6 percent 
of conservatives).
Column 7 of Table 7 shows the effect of the two estate tax treatments on respon-
dents’ likelihood to choose the correct response. Both treatments roughly triple 
the likelihood of answering correctly, strongly suggesting that information is a key 
mechanism behind the large effects of the omnibus treatment.36 Importantly, misin-
formation is not a sufficient condition for an informational treatment to have large 
effects. As noted earlier, Kuklinski et al. (2003) found that correcting substantially 
misinformed views on welfare was not sufficient to change respondents’ support, 
though perhaps the lack of elasticity is due to the racial stereotypes the world “wel-
fare” brings to mind (Gilens 1996). The estate tax may be one of a few issues on 
which voters are highly misinformed but their ignorance is not linked to racial or 
other stereotypes. In any case, extrapolating from the estate tax effects would give 
vastly biased views of the ability of information to move other redistributive policy 
preferences, as we saw in the previous section and as we further document below.
34 See http://www.gallup.com/poll/144899/Tax-Issues-Rank-Top-Priority-Lame-Duck-Congress.aspx (accessed 
December 1, 2014).
35 A recent Pew survey shows that 73 percent of respondents could identify the correct current minimum wage (see 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/10/02/from-isis-to-unemployment-what-do-americans-know/) (accessed Decem-
ber 1, 2014). For the individual income tax, we asked respondents in an earlier pilot to give us their best guess of 
actual average tax rates by income brackets. On average, respondents came fairly close to actual tax rates both in level 
and in terms of progressivity. For example, for top bracket taxpayers with income above $379,150, they guessed a tax 
rate of 29.1 percent on average when the actual tax rate based on 2012 IRS statistics is 26.4 percent. Consistent with 
these results, Fujii and Hawley (1988) find that, on average, survey respondents perceive fairly accurately the marginal 
tax rates they face. 
36 Our results offer experimental support for the observational regression analysis presented by Slemrod (2006), 
none showing that support for the estate tax is lower when respondents believe that most families have to pay it.
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B. Exploring the Limited Treatment Effects on Policy Preferences
We explore three potential explanations for why the omnibus treatment had small 
policy-preference effects (aside from the estate tax). Of course, other explanations 
may exist, so one should not view our analysis of the mechanisms behind the policy 
“non-results” as definitive or exhaustive.
Does Government Distrust Explain Limited Treatment Effects?—As documented 
in Section III, the omnibus treatment significantly reduces trust in government. It 
is perhaps not surprising that an informational treatment emphasizing a dramatic 
increase in income inequality would lower respondents’ view of government. But, 
to our knowledge, it remains an open question whether lowering trust in government 
has a causal effect on policy preferences. This question has perhaps never been more 
relevant in the US context, given that Americans’ trust in government is at histori-
cally low levels, as noted in the introduction.
To test the causal effect of trust in government on policy preferences, we devised a 
treatment that lowers trust but does not affect views on other factors that might affect 
policy preferences. This task is not easy—as we saw with the omnibus treatment, 
information about inequality reduces trust in government, but also increases concern 
about inequality, meaning the omnibus treatment effects on the policy outcomes are 
the joint effect of increasing concern about inequality (which we hypothesize would 
increase support for government action) and reducing trust in government (which 
we hypothesize would decrease it).
We began by collecting a small pilot study ( N ≈ 150 ) on mTurk where we asked 
people to answer our basic trust question (how often they can trust the government to 
do what is right) but then to explain why they answered the way they did. Note that 
they answer this question directly after answering the demographic questions and 
are thus not being primed to think about inequality. There is no “treatment” in this 
pilot—we are merely asking people to explain their opinion. The pilot group cast 
light into why trust in government is currently so low. Respondents feel politicians 
are out to enrich themselves and their wealthiest donors. “Money,” “corporations,” 
and “special interests” are some of the most commonly used words and phrases in 
these answers, as online Appendix Figure 7 shows. The detailed descriptions given 
by respondents allowed us to develop primes we thought could lower trust in gov-
ernment without necessarily affecting other factors that would have a direct effect 
on policy preferences.
Our treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that induce respon-
dents to reflect on aspects of government they dislike. For example, we asked if they 
agree that “Politicians in Washington work to enrich themselves and their largest 
contributors, instead of working for the benefit of the majority of citizens” (90 per-
cent do). We also showed them results from a ranking of OECD countries in terms of 
government transparency in which the United States was categorized in the bottom 
quartile (see online Appendix Figure 8 for a screenshot and online Appendix A for 
the full description).
Results.—Table 8 shows the results of this treatment on a variety of outcomes. 
Column 1 shows that the first stage “works”—the treatment significantly decreases 
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respondents’ stated trust in government, by 5.8 percentage points in absolute terms or 
1.78 times the liberal-conservative gap on this question. This effect is slightly larger 
than the effect of the omnibus treatment (roughly 1.1 times the liberal- conservative 
gap), not surprising given that the goal of this treatment was to lower trust. As we 
saw with the omnibus treatment, respondents appear to separate how much they 
trust the government with what they view as its proper scope, as the treatment has no 
effect on that outcome (column 2). The treatment makes them more likely to view 
the government as wasteful, but the effect is not significant (column 3).
Columns 4–6 suggest that we were largely successful in devising a treatment that 
isolates the effect of trust, at least with respect to our standard questions on income 
inequality and poverty. There is a marginal effect of the treatment in increasing con-
cern about inequality, but no effect on the sense inequality has increased or the sense 
that poverty is a problem. The results from the omnibus treatment suggest that, if 
anything, the uptick in concern about inequality should have a mildly positive effect 
on treatment respondents’ tendency to support redistributive policies. As such, it 
would mask the effects of decreasing trust in government on support for redistribu-
tive policies, which we hypothesize to be negative.
Table 9 displays those results. The treatment decreases support for a tax on mil-
lionaires, though this result is not quite statistically significant (when the continuous 
top tax rate is used instead as the outcome, the coefficient is positive but essentially 
zero, see online Appendix Tables 15 and 16 for this and other results not discussed 
in the main text). While stated support for expanding the estate tax is essentially 
unchanged by the treatment, the stated willingness to petition for its expansion is 
significantly reduced (a scaled effect of 0.588).
The estimated effects of trust on support for transfer programs to the poor are 
much less equivocal. While support for the minimum wage is unaffected (col-
umn  4), treatment respondents significantly reduce their support for “aid to the 
poor” generally (column 5), and food stamps and public housing specifically (col-
umns 6 and 7). Finally, some interesting results emerge when respondents are asked 
to rank a list of options for addressing inequality (a higher number here means more 
Table 8—Effect of Negative Trust Prime on “First-Stage” Variables
Trust Scope Efficient
Inequality very 
serious
Inequality
increased
Poverty versus 
serious
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated −0.0582*** 0.0236 −0.0278 0.0547* 0.0119 −0.00257
[0.0203] [0.0688] [0.0346] [0.0311] [0.0289] [0.0313]
Control mean 0.125 3.031 1.423 0.343 0.755 0.383
Scaled trust effect 1.730 0.0170 0.109 0.182 0.341 0.00828
Observations 899 899 898 899 899 899
Notes: The negative trust prime treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that made respondents 
reflect on aspects of government they dislike. For outcomes, “Efficient” is taken from a 1–3 scale of how much 
respondents think the government wastes money (we “flip” it so that it is increasing with perceived government effi-
ciency). “Poverty very serious” is an indicator variable for whether the respondent views poverty as a very serious 
problem. All other outcomes are as defined previously.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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support). Column 8 shows the treatment causes respondents to elevate a nongovern-
mental solution to inequality—private charity, which, as noted at the beginning of 
the Section, is generally preferred by more conservative respondents.
Discussion.—Decreasing respondents’ trust in government appears to have a 
strong, negative effect on support for direct government transfers. As further sup-
port for the trust mechanism, the treatment has no effect on support for the min-
imum wage, which is an indirect transfer that does not involve the government 
 receiving and redistributing tax dollars. Recall also that the omnibus treatment failed 
to increase support for direct transfer programs (the EITC and food stamps) but 
did increase support for the minimum wage. As Table 9 shows that support for the 
minimum wage appears unaffected by changes in trust, trust emerges as a plausible 
mediating variable that can explain the pattern of results for the omnibus treatment.
Emotional versus Factual Appeals.—There is a long psychology literature that 
suggests that for many issues, emotional appeals produce larger changes in atti-
tudes than more factual presentations.37 Indeed, the estate tax follow-up experiment 
described in Section IVA showed that the neutral treatment had a smaller effect than 
the emotional treatment. While our omnibus treatment provided extensive interac-
tive and personalized information, it was mostly numeric in nature, which may have 
limited its ability to move policy preferences. Similarly, the focus on the “top 1 
percent” might be less effective than focusing more intensely on the bottom of the 
distribution.
To test this idea, we developed a treatment meant to create empathy between the 
respondent and low income families. Again, the treatment was personalized and 
interactive. For example, we asked respondents to “[t]hink about a family of  X 1 with 
X 2 parent(s) working full time…and  X 3 kids…What would be the minimal monthly 
expenses that such a family would have to make to afford living where you live?” 
37 See, e.g., Edwards (1990); Rosselli, Skelly, and Mackie (1995); Loef, Antonides, and Raaij (2001); Huddy 
and Gunnthorsdottir (2000); and citations therein.
Table 9—Effect of Negative Trust Prime on Outcome Variables
$1M tax Estate tax Petition Min. wage Aid poor Food stamps Housing Private charity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated −0.0421 −0.00168 −0.0602* −0.00428 −0.139** −0.153** −0.163*** 0.187**
[0.0275] [0.0266] [0.0236] [0.0902] [0.0616] [0.0673] [0.0614] [0.0791]
Control mean 0.722 0.204 0.174 2.673 2.675 2.454 2.581 1.800
Scaled trust effect 0.0949 0.00728 0.580 0.00531 0.128 0.119 0.133 0.169
Observations 899 895 899 899 899 899 899 850
Notes: The negative trust prime treatment consists of several multiple-choice questions that made respondents reflect on aspects 
of government they dislike. Outcome variables are defined as follows. “Min. wage” is a 0–4 categorical variable increasing in sup-
port for the minimum wage (0 indicates most opposition and 4 indicates most support). “Food stamps” is a 0–4 categorical vari-
able increasing in support for food stamps. “Aid poor” is a 0–4 categorical variable increasing in support for programs that aid poor 
households. “Housing” is a 0–4 categorical variable increasing in support for funding public housing programs. “Private charity” 
is an indicator of where (among a list of five policy approaches) the respondent puts “private charity” as a preferred method for 
addressing inequality (the variable increases with relative support for private charity). All other outcomes are as defined previously.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The values  X 1 ,  X 2 , and  X 3 were interactively matched to the household composition 
that the respondent earlier gave in the demographic module at the start of the survey. 
The respondent then entered dollar amounts for monthly rent, utilities, transporta-
tion, food, and expenses related to children. We then showed them how the budget 
they devised compared with the income at the poverty line (based on the respon-
dents’ household size), emphasizing to them that the budget did not even include 
items such as health care, clothing, furniture, and costs related to schooling (see the 
online Appendix for a complete description of the treatment and online Appendix 
Figure 9 for a screenshot).38 The slides with this information also included photos 
of low income families.
Results.—Overall, the results track very closely to those from the original omni-
bus treatment. We obtain large “first-stage” effects on concern for poverty and 
inequality, but little movement on policy preferences.
Table 10 presents the key outcomes. The treatment has significant effects on con-
cern about inequality (column 1), and, not surprisingly, large effects on whether 
poverty is a serious problem (equal to over 30 percent of the political gap for this 
outcome).39 However, just like the omnibus treatment, this follow-up “emotional” 
treatment has limited effect on policy preferences. Of the four poverty-policy ques-
tions we asked, only two exhibit a marginally significant treatment effect (food 
stamps and aid to the poor, and even then just below 8 percent of the political gap). 
Similar to the omnibus treatment, this follow-up treatment reduces trust in govern-
ment, though the effect is smaller and not significant.40
38 The large majority (76 percent) devise a budget in excess of the income at the poverty line for a household 
of their type. 
39 As detailed in online Appendix Table 17, the treatment increased the likelihood of correctly choosing the 
actual poverty rate from multiple choices, though, because many control respondents overestimated the poverty 
rate, it did not on net increase their estimate of the poverty rate. The fact that the treatment had such a large effect 
on perceiving poverty as a “very serious problem” likely works through the intensive margin: perhaps through the 
creation of empathy, the treatment highlights how difficult it would be to manage with limited income. 
40 The treatment had very small but positive effects on taxes on the well-off, always well below 10 percent of 
the political gap and not significant. See online Appendix Tables 17 and 18 for these and all other outcomes not 
displayed in Table 10. 
Table 10—Effect of “Emotional” Treatment on Outcome Variables
Inequality 
very serious
Inequality 
increased
Poverty very 
serious
Min.
wage
Aid
poor
Food
stamps Housing
Trust
government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.0783*** 0.0410 0.0885*** 0.0469 0.117* 0.177* 0.0397 −0.00979
[0.0292] [0.0258] [0.0313] [0.0989] [0.0665] [0.101] [0.0670] [0.0211]
Control mean 0.337 0.775 0.296 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 0.124
Scaled poverty effect 0.221 0.225 0.257 0.0449 0.0714 0.0866 0.0291 0.0931
Observation 1,002 1,001 799 799 799 799 799 1,002
Notes: The “emotional” treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living in poverty. Respondents 
were told about poverty rates and filled out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city. Respondents were then 
shown how their minimum budget compared to the poverty line. All outcomes are as defined previously. “Min. wage,” “Aid poor,” 
“Food stamps,” “Housing” are all categorical 0–4 and increasing in support as in Table 9. The lower number of observations in col-
umns 3–7 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smaller wave (sample of 200).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Discussion.—As readers can verify by taking the surveys themselves, the omni-
bus treatment and this “emotional” follow-up are very different in spirit. The omni-
bus treatment focused largely on the top 1 percent and was more factual in nature, 
whereas the follow-up treatment focused on the disadvantaged and sought to create 
empathy both with our “put yourselves in their shoes” exercise as well as photo-
graphs of low income families.
Despite these stark differences, the results are very similar. It is relatively easy 
for treatments to affect how much individuals are “concerned” with any issue, but 
much harder to increase their support for policies that would seem directly related to 
addressing said issues. Our final follow-up survey attempts to make the connection 
to policy measures more explicit.
Connecting “Concerns” with Policy Measures.—Bartels (2005, p. 16) docu-
ments the seemingly odd result that even though the individuals in his 2002 sample 
were worried about inequality and aware that the tax cuts proposed by the Bush 
administration in 2001 favored the wealthy, they still supported them by a large mar-
gin. He concludes that “Americans support tax cuts not because they are indifferent 
to economic inequality, but because they largely fail to connect inequality and pub-
lic policy.”
We directly test this notion—that respondents do not connect their “concerns” 
with policies meant to address them—in our final follow-up survey. In this version, 
we largely repeat the low income “emotional” treatment described in Section IIB, but 
also add slides showing how current government programs help these  households. 
First, after entering in the expenses in the budget exercise, the treatment describes 
a family earning one full-time full-year minimum-wage income, making a salient 
connection between the level of the minimum wage and family income at the bot-
tom of the income distribution. Second, respondents are told that “The food stamps 
program helps many low income families, such as those earning only one minimum 
wage. It provides $150/month per person to help with food expenses.” Hence, the 
connection between poverty and a government program is made explicit. Online 
Appendix Figure 10 provides a screenshot.
Results.—We repeat the results for the key outcome variables in Table 11. The 
“first-stage” effects of this treatment are smaller and not significant. It is not surpris-
ing that we do not see much movement in variables related to inequality, since the 
treatment did not provide any direct information on the topic. Despite the focus on 
the situation of a low income household, treatment respondents do not view poverty 
as a more serious problem. We speculate that emphasizing the efficacy of a govern-
ment poverty program might have the effect of making poverty and inequality seem 
less severe.
Despite the somewhat smaller first-stage effects, the effects on our policy out-
comes are consistently positive and significant. Support rises for the minimum wage 
(column 3), aid to the poor (column 4), food stamps (column 5), and public housing 
(column 6). The effect on “aid to the poor” is positive but not significant. It should 
be noted, however, that with the exception of the minimum wage, these effects are 
still relatively small (roughly about 10–15 percent of the political gap). It is also the 
case that the treatment does not consistently increase support for actually sending 
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money to Washington to pay for these policies: the effects on income and estate 
taxes for the well-off are mixed (see online Appendix Tables 19 and 20).
However, it does appear that the interaction of the empathic portrayal of low 
income families along with information emphasizing the efficacy of a transfer 
program has a meaningful effect on the policies respondents support. Column 7 
suggests that, in contrast to the trust treatment, this treatment reduces the relative 
attractiveness of the nongovernmental solution to inequality: private charity. Finally, 
column 8 shows that there is no significant effect of the treatment on trust in govern-
ment, though the point estimate is negative.
Discussion.—While this treatment indeed moved policy preferences, it is worth 
noting its highly explicit nature. After completing an exercise where they contem-
plated the budget constraints of a low income family, respondents were shown 
in concrete terms how a government program helps such a household make ends 
meet. Even then, while support for many poverty-related programs significantly 
increased, the largest effect remains the minimum wage, an  indirect transfer pro-
gram. Moreover, the treatment does not have a consistent effect in terms of inducing 
treatment participants to desire higher taxes (even if only on the wealthy) to pay for 
these programs.
Taken together, the results from these three follow-up surveys suggest the diffi-
culty in moving most policy preferences. While concern for an issue is highly elastic 
to information, translating this concern into a change in policy preference appears 
very difficult, with the consistent exception of the estate tax.
V. Conclusion
The standard median-voter model predicts that support for redistribution should 
increase with income inequality, yet there has been little evidence of greater 
demand for redistribution over the past 30 years in the United States—despite his-
toric increases in income concentration. A possible explanation is that people are 
unaware of the increase in inequality, such that greater information would substan-
tially move redistributive preferences. We gather over 10,000 observations using 
Table 11—Effect of Policy Treatment on Outcome Variables
Inequality  
very serious
Poverty
very serious
Min.
wage
Aid
poor
Food
stamps Housing
Private
charity
Trust
government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy treatment 0.0405 −0.00637 0.323*** 0.133** 0.313*** 0.176*** −0.137* −0.0325
[0.0279] [0.0272] [0.0949] [0.0638] [0.0970] [0.0636] [0.0709] [0.0207]
Control mean 0.343 0.326 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 2.025 0.149
Scaled policy effect 0.108 0.0196 0.310 0.0811 0.153 0.129 0.0740 0.654
Observations 1,111 1,111 806 806 806 806 1,068 1,111
Notes: The policy treatment aimed at creating empathy between the respondent and families living on a minimum wage. Respondents 
filled out a minimum budget for a family like theirs living in the same city. Respondents were then shown how their minimum bud-
get compared to the minimum wage and how food stamps add $150 per person/month to the budget of such a family. All outcomes 
are as defined previously. “Min. wage,” “Aid poor,” “Food stamps,” “Housing” are all categorical 0–4 and increasing in support as 
in Table 9. The lower number of observations in columns 3–7 is due to the fact that these questions were not asked in one smaller 
wave (sample of 300).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to conduct a series of survey experiments to extensively 
explore this hypothesis.
Our results suggest that, generally, greater information can increase respondents’ 
sense of concern about an issue, but not necessarily their support for policies that 
might ameliorate it. Information about income inequality and poverty has only a 
limited (and typically statistically insignificant) tendency to increase support for 
higher income taxes on the well-off or transfer programs for the disadvantaged.
We present evidence that extreme distrust of government appears to explain part 
of this null effect. First, trust in government is very low in our sample, as it cur-
rently is among Americans more generally. Second, many of our treatments appear 
to further reduce this already low level of trust. Third, and most novel relative to 
the literature, we show that decreasing trust has a causal effect on diminishing sup-
port for redistribution. We develop a prime that reduces trust in government without 
significantly moving respondents’ concern for inequality and poverty: respondents 
exposed to this prime significantly reduce their support for programs that involve 
the government directly redistributing tax dollars, while increasing their support for 
nongovernmental solutions such as private charity.
Only when we explicitly show individuals the concrete effects of government 
poverty policies do we observe consistent, statistically significant increases in sup-
port for such policies.41 Even so, such effects are small, and are largest for indirect 
transfer programs such as the minimum wage that do not involve the government 
collecting and redistributing tax dollars.
Future work might further probe the connection between government trust and 
policy preferences. Underlying mistrust might help to explain the reluctance to sup-
port policies that would seem to be in the majority’s self-interest. Relatedly, distrust 
could explain why minimum wage increases typically enjoy 70–80 percent support 
in surveys. Many economists assume that respondents simply misunderstand the 
incidence of the minimum wage. Instead, it might be the case that they view the 
minimum wage as imperfect, but better than other redistributive policies that involve 
sending money to Washington, DC.42 In future work, it would be valuable to test 
whether treatments that increase trust in the government also increase support for 
redistributive policies.
As we extensively document, the estate tax is the exception to the generally 
small effects of information on policy: even a four-sentence description providing 
 information on its incidence significantly increases support for the policy. At least 
part of this effect appears due to vast misinformation—many respondents both in 
our survey and past work on the estate tax believe a majority of families are subject 
to it, whereas the actual share is 0.1 percent.
It remains an open question if misinformation fully explains the difference. For 
example, Americans might view the moral claims to inheritance versus income 
 differently. If the goal of the estate tax is to prevent the self-perpetuation of extreme 
wealth, then respondents might still support it even if, say, the government merely 
41 Future work could also explore how emphasizing the negative aspects of redistribution, such as reduced labor 
supply, could affect preferences for redistribution. 
42 Notably, voters in several conservative states passed minimum wage hikes in the 2014 midterm elections, 
consistent with their not viewing the minimum wage as a “government program.” 
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burns the money it collects. Therefore, low levels of trust in government may not 
inhibit support for the estate tax as much as for other policies where efficiency is 
a more salient goal. Independent of the origin of the treatment effect, the large 
 elasticity of support for the estate tax in response to basic information that we and 
past work have documented is highly policy-relevant, given the recent rise in inher-
itance flows in many developed countries.43
Randomized online surveys are a powerful and convenient tool for studying the 
effects of information treatments on attitudes and behaviors, one we imagine can 
be used to extend the results we have documented. The tool is powerful because it 
can reach large samples of US residents (in the thousands) at fairly low cost ($1–
$2 per respondent). It is convenient because, using widely available software, online 
surveys are now very easy to design. Hence, it becomes more feasible to explore 
mechanisms behind results. For example, we were able to easily design companion 
experiments to test mechanisms potentially underlying the effects in our original, 
omnibus treatment. Therefore, in contrast to field experiments which are very costly 
to set up and replicate, online survey experiments lend themselves naturally to con-
ducting series of experiments where results from an initial experiment lead to new 
experiments to cast light on potential mechanisms.
Such flexibility will allow researchers to gain a more nuanced understanding of 
redistributive preferences. While projections are by nature uncertain, the US gov-
ernment is expected to face a long-run fiscal imbalance, largely due to the aging 
of the population and rising health care costs.44 European countries face similar 
challenges. The distributional effects of any future fiscal rebalancing—raising taxes, 
cutting spending, or both—will depend in large part on voters’ redistributive prefer-
ences, how strongly they hold them, and whether and how they act on them. As such, 
these questions are of first-order importance in public economics. We believe that 
the methodology we employed in this paper can be used in future research to better 
understand how individuals’ redistributive preferences are formed and shaped.
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